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Diese Begegnung. Das Problem der Immanenz bei Spinoza in der Auslegung Hegels

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Abstract (English)

The present work is an examination of Hegel's interpretation of Spinoza's philosophy, without, however, taking a stand for one of the two thinkers from the very beginning. For this reason, the larger goal is an in-depth engagement with both movements of thought. Central to this is the question of how thought can sustain itself. According to Hegel, this is not possible with Spinoza, which is why he characterizes Spinozism as acosmism: Spinoza's substance is, according to Hegel, a beginning without determination, from which all that is thought and extended follows as finite modifications (modes). Because substance is infinite, it remains indeterminate and thus motionless. Its activity takes place only in its manifestation through its modes. Since the relationship between the infinite and the finite cannot be maintained in Spinoza, the finite modes fall back into the infinite substance and dissolve in it. According to Hegel, Spinozism resulting from this ontological structure is a-cosmism: there is no thinking and no extension, consequently there is nothing. According to Hegel, the problem of immanence lies in the fact that substance as thinking of the beginning does not become a beginning of thinking as a thinking that sustains itself in its immanent beginning in a speculative way. For this reason, Hegel develops Spinoza and his substance immanently, in that the latter is led to himself through Hegel, and in doing so, the former simultaneously finds himself through Spinoza. A central aspect, however, which Hegel neglected in his interpretation of Spinoza, is that the modes cannot emerge from the substance. Everything that is, is in the substance in such a way that everything is reflected in it, whereby the substance reflects, or rather manifests itself. In this way nothing can fall back into the substance since everything is always already contained in the substance so that nothing lies outside of it. The modes recognize the substance by participating in it. In this participation, they find themselves in a causality structure that develops in infinity as in the substance thereby recognizing it. The more the modes grasp themselves in their causal relations, the more adequately the substance manifests itself. Spinoza's substance does not first have to be developed immanently, as Hegel attempts to do, but must rather be recognized in its immanence.